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Abstract—In this paper we propose redundancy management
of heterogeneous wireless sensor networks (HWSNs), utilizing
multipath routing to answer user queries in the presence of
unreliable and malicious nodes. The key concept of our redun-
dancy management is to exploit the tradeoff between energy
consumption vs. the gain in reliability, timeliness, and security
to maximize the system useful lifetime. We formulate the tradeoff
as an optimization problem for dynamically determining the best
redundancy level to apply to multipath routing for intrusion
tolerance so that the query response success probability is
maximized while prolonging the useful lifetime. Furthermore,
we consider this optimization problem for the case in which a
voting-based distributed intrusion detection algorithm is applied
to detect and evict malicious nodes in a HWSN. We develop a
novel probability model to analyze the best redundancy level in
terms of path redundancy and source redundancy, as well as the
best intrusion detection settings in terms of the number of voters
and the intrusion invocation interval under which the lifetime of a
HWSN is maximized. We then apply the analysis results obtained
to the design of a dynamic redundancy management algorithm to
identify and apply the best design parameter settings at runtime
in response to environment changes, to maximize the HWSN
lifetime.
Index Terms—Heterogeneous wireless sensor networks, mul-
tipath routing, intrusion detection, reliability, security, energy
conservation.
I. INTRODUCTION
M
ANY wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are deployed in
an unattended environment in which energy replenish-
ment is difﬁcult if not impossible. Due to limited resources,
a WSN must not only satisfy the application speciﬁc QoS
requirements such as reliability, timeliness and security, but
also minimize energy consumption to prolong the system
useful lifetime. The tradeoff between energy consumption vs.
reliability gain with the goal to maximize the WSN system
lifetime has been well explored in the literature. However, no
prior work exists to consider the tradeoff in the presence of
malicious attackers.
It is commonly believed in the research community that
clustering is an effective solution for achieving scalability, en-
ergy conservation, and reliability. Using homogeneous nodes
which rotate among themselves in the roles of cluster heads
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(CHs) and sensor nodes (SNs) leveraging CH election proto-
cols such as HEED [1] for lifetime maximization has been
considered [2], [3]. Recent studies [4]–[6] demonstrated that
using heterogeneous nodes can further enhance performance
and prolong the system lifetime. In the latter case, nodes with
superior resources serve as CHs performing computationally
intensive tasks while inexpensive less capable SNs are utilized
mainly for sensing the environment.
The tradeoff issue between energy consumption vs. QoS
gain becomes much more complicated when inside attackers
are present as a path may be broken when a malicious node
is on the path. This is especially the case in heterogeneous
WSN (HWSN) environments in which CH nodes may take a
more critical role in gathering and routing sensing data. Thus,
very likely the system would employ an intrusion detection
system (IDS) with the goal to detect and remove malicious
nodes. While the literature is abundant in intrusion detection
techniques for WSNs [7]–[11], the issue of how often intrusion
detection should be invoked for energy reasons in order to
remove potentially malicious nodes so that the system lifetime
is maximized (say to prevent a Byzantine failure [12]) is
largely unexplored. The issue is especially critical for energy-
constrained WSNs designed to stay alive for a long mission
time.
Multipath routing is considered an effective mechanism
for fault and intrusion tolerance to improve data delivery in
WSNs. The basic idea is that the probability of at least one
path reaching the sink node or base station increases as we
have more paths doing data delivery. While most prior research
focused on using multipath routing to improve reliability [2],
[3], [13], some attention has been paid to using multipath
routing to tolerate insider attacks [14]–[16]. These studies,
however, largely ignored the tradeoff between QoS gain vs.
energy consumption which can adversely shorten the system
lifetime.
The research problem we are addressing in this paper is
effective redundancy management of a clustered HWSN to
prolong its lifetime operation in the presence of unreliable
and malicious nodes. We address the tradeoff between energy
consumption vs. QoS gain in reliability, timeliness and se-
curity with the goal to maximize the lifetime of a clustered
HWSN while satisfying application QoS requirements in the
context of multipath routing. More speciﬁcally, we analyze
the optimal amount of redundancy through which data are
routed to a remote sink in the presence of unreliable and
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malicious nodes, so that the query success probability is max-
imized while maximizing the HWSN lifetime. We consider
this optimization problem for the case in which a voting-
based distributed intrusion detection algorithm is applied to
remove malicious nodes from the HWSN. Our contribution
is a model-based analysis methodology by which the optimal
multipath redundancy levels and intrusion detection settings
may be identiﬁed for satisfying application QoS requirements
while maximizing the lifetime of HWSNs.
For the issue of intrusion tolerance through multipath rout-
ing, there are two major problems to solve: (1) how many
paths to use and (2) what paths to use. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to address the “how many paths
to use” problem. For the “what paths to use” problem, our
approach is distinct from existing work in that we do not
consider speciﬁc routing protocols (e.g., MDMP for WSNS
[17] or AODV for MANETs [18]), nor the use of feedback
information to solve the problem. Rather, for energy conser-
vation, we employ a distributed light-weight IDS by which
intrusion detection is performed only locally. Nodes that are
identiﬁed compromised are removed from the HWSN. Only
compromised nodes that survive detection have the chance to
disturb routing. One main contribution of our paper is that we
decide “how many paths to use” in order to tolerate residual
compromised nodes that survive our IDS, so as to maximize
the HWSN lifetime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II we discuss related work and contrast our approach with
existing work on multipath routing for intrusion tolerance and
reliability enhancement. In Section III, we deﬁne our system
model with system assumptions given. In Section IV we derive
an analytical expression for the system lifetime, considering
factors such as query rate, attacker behavior, node capture
rate, link reliability, and energy consumption. In Section V we
present numerical data and provide physical interpretations of
the results. In Section VI, we present a dynamic management
algorithm for managing redundancy of multipath routing for
intrusion tolerance to maximize the system lifetime while sat-
isfying the system reliability, timeliness and security require-
ments in the presence of unreliable wireless communication
and malicious nodes. Finally in Section VII we conclude the
paper and outline some future research areas.
II. RELATED WORK
Over the past few years, many protocols exploring the trade-
off between energy consumption and QoS gain particularly in
reliability in HWSNs have been proposed. In [19], the optimal
communication range and communication mode were derived
to maximize the HWSN lifetime. In [20], the authors devised
intra-cluster scheduling and inter-cluster multi-hop routing
schemes to maximize the network lifetime. They considered
a hierarchal HWSN with CH nodes having larger energy
and processing capabilities than normal SNs. The solution
is formulated as an optimization problem to balance energy
consumption across all nodes with their roles. In either work
cited above, no consideration was given to the existence of ma-
licious nodes. In [21], the authorsconsidered a two-tier HWSN
with the objective of maximizing network lifetime while
fulﬁlling power management and coverage objectives. They
determined the optimal density ratio of the two tier’s nodes
to maximize the system lifetime. Relative to [21] our work
also considers heterogeneous nodes with different densities
and capabilities. However, our work considers the presence
of malicious nodes and explores the tradeoff between energy
consumption vs. QoS gain in both security and reliability to
maximize the system lifetime.
In the context of secure multipath routing for intrusion
tolerance, [22] provides an excellent survey in this topic.
In [15] the authors considered a multipath routing protocol
to tolerate black hole and selective forwarding attacks. The
basic idea is to use overhearing to avoid sending packets to
malicious nodes. In [14] the authors considered a disjoint
multipath routing protocol to tolerate intrusion using multiple
disjoint paths in WSNs. Our work also uses multipath routing
to tolerate intrusion. However, we speciﬁcally consider energy
being consumed for intrusion detection, and both CHs and
SNs can be compromised for lifetime maximization. In [23] a
randomized dispersive multipath routing protocol is proposed
to avoid black holes. The randomized multipath routes are
dispersive to avoid the black hole and to enhance the proba-
bility of at least k out of n shares based on coding theory can
reach the receiver. The approach, however, does not consider
intrusion detection to detect compromised nodes. Relative to
[23] our work also uses multipath routing to circumvent black
hole attacks for intrusion tolerance. Moreover, we consider
intrusion detection to detect and evict compromised nodes
as well as the best rate to invoke intrusion detection to best
tradeoff energy consumption vs. security and reliability gain
to maximize the system lifetime.
Over the past few years, numerous protocols have been
proposed to detect intrusion in WSNs. [7], [11] provide
excellent surveys of the subject. In [10], a decentralized rule-
based intrusion detection system is proposed by which monitor
nodes are responsible for monitoring neighboring nodes. The
monitor nodes apply predeﬁned rules to collect messages and
raise alarms if the number of failures exceeds a threshold
value. Our host IDS essentially follows this strategy, with
the ﬂaws of the host IDS characterized by a false positive
probability (Hpfp) and a false negative probability (Hpfn).I n
[10], however, no consideration is given about bad-mouthing
attacks by compromised monitor nodes themselves, so if a
monitor node is malicious, it can quickly infect others. In [8],
a collaborative approach is proposed for intrusion detection
where the decision is based on a majority voting of moni-
toring nodes. Their work, however, does not consider energy
consumption issues associated with a distributed IDS, nor the
issue of maximizing the WSN lifetime while satisfying QoS
requirements in security, reliability and timeliness. Our voting-
based IDS approach extends from [9] with considerations
given to the tradeoff between energy loss vs. security and
reliability gain due to employment of the voting-based IDS
with the goal to prolong the system lifetime.
In general there are two approaches by which energy-
efﬁcient IDS can be implemented in WSNs. One approach
especially applicable to ﬂat WSNs is for an intermediate node
to feedback maliciousness and energy status of its neighbor
nodes to the sender node (e.g., the source or sink node)
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nodes with unacceptable maliciousness or energy status [17],
[24]. Another approach which we adopt in this paper is to
use local host-based IDS for energy conservation (with SNs
monitoring neighbor SNs and CHs monitoring neighbor CHs
only), coupled with voting to cope with node collusion for
implementing IDS functions (as discussed in Section III in the
paper). Energy efﬁciency is achieved by applying the optimal
detection interval to perform IDS functions. Our solution
considers the optimal IDS detection interval that can best
balance intrusion accuracy vs. energy consumption due to
intrusion detection activities, so as to maximize the system
lifetime.
Compared with existing works cited above, our work is
distinct in that we consider redundancy management for both
intrusion/fault tolerance through multipath routing and intru-
sion detection through voting-based IDS design to maximize
the system lifetime of a HWSN in the presence of unreliable
and malicious nodes.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A HWSN comprises sensors of different capabilities. We
consider two types of sensors: CHs and SNs. CHs are superior
to SNs in energy and computational resources. We use ECH
init
and ESN
init to denote the initial energy levels of CHs and
SNs, respectively. While our approach can be applied to any
shape of the operational area, for analytical tractability, we
assume that the deployment area of the HWSN is of size
A2. CHs and SNs are distributed in the operational area. To
ensure coverage, we assume that CHs and SNs are deployed
randomly and distributed according to homogeneous spatial
Poisson processes with intensities λCH and λSN, respectively,
with λCH <λ SN. The radio ranges used by CH and SN
transmission is denoted by rCH and rSN, respectively. The
radio range and the transmission power of both CHs and SNs
are dynamically adjusted throughout the system lifetime to
maintain the connectivity between CHs and between SNs. Any
communication between two nodes with a distance greater
than single hop radio range between them would require multi-
hop routing. Due to limited energy, a packet is sent hop by
hop without using acknowledgment or retransmission [2].
All sensors are subject to capture attacks, i.e., they are
vulnerable to physical capture by the adversary after which
their code is compromised and they become inside attackers.
Since all sensors are randomly located in the operational
area, the same capture rate applies to both CHs and SNs,
and, as a result, the compromised nodes are also randomly
distributed in the operation area. Due to limited resources, we
assume that when a node is compromised, it only performs
two most energy conserving attacks, namely, bad-mouthing
attacks (recommending a good node as a bad node and a bad
node as a good node) when serving as a recommender, and
packet dropping attacks [25] when performing packet routing
to disrupt the operation of the network.
Environment conditions which could cause a node to fail
with a certain probability include hardware failure (q),a n d
transmission failure due to noise and interference (e).M o r e -
over, the hostility to the HWSN is characterized by a per-node
capture rate of λc which can be determined based on historical
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Fig. 1. Source and path redundancy for a heterogeneous WSN.
data and knowledge about the target application environment.
These probabilities are assumed to be constant and known at
deployment time.
Queries can be issued by a mobile user (while moving)
and can be issued anywhere in the HWSN through a nearby
CH. A CH which takes a query to process is called a query
processing center (PC). Many mission critical applications,
e.g., emergency rescue and military battleﬁeld, have a deadline
requirement. We assume that each query has a strict timeliness
requirement (Treq). The query must be delivered within Treq
seconds; otherwise, the query fails.
Redundancy management of multipath routing for intrusion
tolerance is achieved through two forms of redundancy: (a)
source redundancy by which ms SNs sensing a physical
phenomenon in the same feature zone are used to forward
sensing data to their CH (referred to as the source CH); (b)
path redundancy by which mp paths are used to relay packets
from the source CH to the PC through intermediate CHs. Fig.
1 shows a scenario with a source redundancy of 3 (ms =3 )
and a path redundancy of 2 (mp =2 ) . It has been reported
that the number of edge-disjoint paths between nodes is equal
to the average node degree with a very high probability [26].
Therefore, when the density is sufﬁciently high such that the
average number of one-hop neighbors is sufﬁciently larger
than mp and ms, we can effectively result in mp redundant
paths for path redundancy and ms distinct paths from ms
sensors for source redundancy.
We assume that geographic routing [18], a well-known
routing protocol for WSNs, is used to route the information
between nodes; thus, no path information is maintained. The
location of the destination node needs to be known to correctly
forward a packet. As part of clustering, a CH knows the
locations of SNs within its cluster, and vice versa. A CH
also knows the location of neighbor CHs along the direction
towards the processing center.
We assume that sensors operate in power saving mode (e.g.
[27], [28]). Thus, a sensor is either active (transmitting or
receiving) or in sleep mode. For the transmission and reception
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[1] for both CHs and SNs.
To preserve conﬁdentiality, we assume that the HWSN ex-
ecutes a pairwise key establishment protocol (e.g., [29], [30])
in a secure interval after deployment. Each node establishes
pairwise keys with its k-hop neighbors, where k is large
enough to cover a cluster area. Thus, when SNs join a new
cluster, the CH node will have pairwise keys with the SNs
joining its cluster. Since every SN shares a pairwise key with
its CH, a SN can encrypt data sent to the CH for conﬁdentiality
and authentication purposes. Every CH also creates a pairwise
key with every other CH. Thus a pairwise key exists for secure
communication between CHs. This mechanism is useful to
prevent outside attackers, not inside attackers.
To detect compromised nodes, every node runs a simple
host IDS to assess its neighbors. Our host IDS is light-weight
to conserve energy. It is also generic and does not rely on the
feedback mechanism tied in with a speciﬁc routing protocol
(e.g., MDMP for WSNS [17] or AODV for MANETs [18]).
It is based on local monitoring. That is, each node monitors
its neighbor nodes only. Each node uses a set of anomaly
detection rules such as a high discrepancyin the sensor reading
or recommendation has been experienced, a packet is not
forwarded as requested, as well as interval, retransmission,
repetition, and delay rules as in [10], [31]–[33]. If the count
exceeds a system-deﬁned threshold, a neighbor node that is
being monitored is considered compromised. The imperfection
of monitoring due to environment noise or channel error is
modeled by a “host” false positive probability (Hpfp) and a
“host” false negative probability (Hpfn) which are assumed
known at deployment time.
To remove malicious nodes from the system, a voting-based
distributed IDS is applied periodically in every TIDS time
interval. A CH is being assessed by its neighbor CHs, and a
SN is being assessed by its neighbor SNs. In each interval, m
neighbor nodes (at the CH or SN level) around a target node
will be chosen randomly as voters and each cast their votes
based on their host IDS results to collectively decide if the
target node is still a good node. The m voters share their votes
through secure transmission using their pairwise keys. When
the majority of voters come to the conclusion that a target
node is bad, then the target node is evicted. For both CHs
and SNs, there is a system-level false positive probability Pfp
that the voters can incorrectly identify a good node as a bad
node. There is also a system-level false negative probability
Pfn that the voters can incorrectly misidentify a bad node as
a good node. These two system-level IDS probabilities will be
derived based on the bad-mouthing attack model in the paper.
Here we note that increasing source or path redundancy
enhances reliability and security. However, it also increases
the energy consumption, thus contributing to the decrease of
the system lifetime. Thus, there is a tradeoff between relia-
bility/security gain vs. energy consumption. The distributed
IDS design attempts to detect and evict compromised nodes
from the network without unnecessarily wasting energy so as
to maximize the query success probability and the system life-
time. The effectiveness of the IDS depends on its parameters
(TIDS and m). While a shorter TIDS or a higher m can result
in low Pfp and Pfn, it also consumes more energy from the
sensor nodes. Thus, this is another design tradeoff.
TABLE I
NOTATION OF SYMBOLS
Symbol Meaning Type 
A  Length of each side of a square sensor area 
(meter)  input 
nb  Size of a data packet (bit)  input 
Eelec
Energy dissipation to run the transmitter and 
receiver circuitry (J/bit)  input 
Eamp  Energy used by the transmit amplifier to achieve 
an acceptable signal to noise ratio (J/bit/m
2) input 
Eo Initial energy per node (Joule)  input 
Einit Initial energy of the HWSN (Joule)  derived 
Eclustering(t)  Energy consumed for executing the clustering 
algorithm at time t (Joule)  derived 
EIDS(t) Energy consumed for executing the IDS 
algorithm at time t (Joule)  input 
Eq(t)  Energy consumed for executing a query at time t
(Joule)  derived 
Rq(t)  Probability that a query reply at time t is 
delivered successfully by the deadline  derived 
r  Wireless radio communication range (meter)  input 
q  node hardware failure probability  input 
ej  Transmission failure probability of node j input 
N(t)  Number of nodes in the HWSN at time t input 
NCH(t)  Number of CHs in the HWSN at time t derived 
NSN(t)  Number of SNs in the HWSN at time t derived 
n(t)  Number of neighbor nodes at time t derived 
ngood(t)  Number of good neighbor nodes at time t derived 
nbad(t)  Number of bad neighbor nodes at time t derived 
Nq  Maximum number of queries before energy 
exhaustion  derived 
mp  Path redundancy level: Number of paths from a 
source CH to the sink  design 
ms  Source redundancy level: Number of SNs per 
cluster in response to a query  design 
f  Fraction of neighbor nodes that will forward data  input 
λ(t)  Node population density (nodes/meter
2) at time t derived 
λ  Node population density at deployment time  input 
λq  Query arrival rate (times/sec)  input 
Sjk  Progressive transmission speed between node j
and node k (meter/sec)  derived 
Tclustering  Time interval for executing the clustering 
algorithm (sec)  input 
Treq  Query deadline requirement (sec)  input 
λc  Node capture rate  input 
α  Ratio of IDS execution rate to query arrival rate  input 
β  Ratio of clustering rate to query arrival rate  input 
m  Number of voters selected for executing 
distributed IDS  design 
Hpfp  Probability of host IDS false positive  input 
Hpfn  Probability of host IDS false negative  input 
Pfp  Probability of distributed IDS false positive  derived 
Pfn  Probability of distributed IDS false negative  derived 
  IDS interval time (sec)  design 
MTTF Lifetime  of  a  HWSN  output 
To provide a unifying metric that considers the above two
design tradeoffs, we deﬁne the total number of queries the
system can answer correctly until it fails as the lifetime or
the mean time to failure (MTTF) of the system, which can
be translated into the actual system lifetime span given the
query arrival rate. A failure occurs when no response is
received before the query deadline. The cause could be due
to energy exhaustion, packet dropping by malicious nodes,
channel/node failure, or insufﬁcient transmission speed to
meet the timeliness requirement. Our aim is to ﬁnd both
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the MTTF is maximized, when given a set of parameters
characterizing the operational and environment conditions.
IV. PROBABILITY MODEL
In this section we develop a probability model to estimate
the MTTF of a HWSN using multipath data forwarding to an-
swer queries issued from a mobile user roaming in the HWSN
area. Table I provides the notation used for symbols and their
physical meanings. We use the same notation for both CHs and
SNs, e.g., Pfp and Pfn. When differentiating a CH from a SN
is necessary, we use the superscripts or subscripts “CH” and
“SN”, e.g., P CH
fp and P CH
fn for a CH, and P SN
fp and P SN
fn for a
SN. A parameter is labeled as input, derived, design or output.
In particular, mp (path redundancy), ms (source redundancy),
m (the number of voters for intrusion detection) and TIDS
(the intrusion detection interval) are design parameters whose
values are to be identiﬁed to maximize MTTF, when given
a set of input parameter values charactering the operational
and environmental conditions. Derived parameters are those
deriving from input parameters. There is only one output
parameter, namely, MTTF. Note that most derived parameters
are dynamic, i.e., as a function of time. For example, node
density denoted by λ(t) decreases over time because of node
failure/eviction as time progresses. On the other hand, the
radio ranges for CHs and SNs, denoted by rCH and rSN,
increase over time to maintain network connectivity.
The basic idea of our MTTF formulation is that we ﬁrst
deduce the maximum number of queries, Nq, the system can
possible handle before running into energy exhaustion for
the best case in which all queries are processed successfully.
Because the system evolves dynamically,the amount of energy
spent per query also varies dynamically. Given the query
arrival rate λq as input, the average interval between query
arrivals is 1/λq. So we can reasonably estimate the amount of
energy spent due to query processing and intrusion detection
for query j based on the query arrival time tQ,j.N e x tw e
derive the corresponding query success probability Rq (tQ,j),
that is, the probability that the response to query j arriving
at time tQ,j is delivered successfully to the PC before the
query deadline expires. Finally, we compute MTTF as the
probability-weighted average of the number of queries the
system can handle without experiencing any deadline, trans-
mission, or security failure. More speciﬁcally, the MTTF is
computed by:
MTTF =
Nq−1  
i=1
i
⎛
⎝
i  
j=1
Rq (tQ,j)
⎞
⎠(1 − Rq (tQ,i+1))
+ Nq
Nq  
j=1
Rq (tQ,j) (1)
Here
 
i  
j=1
Rq (tQ,j)
 
(1 − Rq (tQ,i+1)) accounts for the
probability of the system being able to successfully execute i
consecutive queries but failing the i +1 th query. The second
term is for the best case in which all queries are processed
successfully without experiencing any failure for which the
system will have the longest lifetime span.
A. Network Dynamics
Initially at deployment time all nodes (CHs or SNs) are
good nodes. Assume that the capture time of a SN follows
a distribution function Fc(t) which can be determined based
on historical data and knowledge about the target application
environment. Then, the probability that a SN is compromised
at time t, given that it was a good node at time t − TIDS,
denoted by Pc, is given by:
Pc =1 − P {X>t |X>t− TIDS}
=1 −
P {X>t ,X>t− TIDS}
P {X>t− TIDS}
=1 −
1 − Fc (t)
1 − Fc (t − TIDS)
(2)
We note that Pc is time dependent. For the special case in
which the capture time is exponential distributed with rate λc,
Pc =1−e−λc×TIDS. Recall that the voting-based distributed
IDS executes periodically with TIDS being the interval. At
the ith IDS execution time (denoted by tI,i), a good node may
have been compromised with probability Pc since the previous
IDS execution time (tI,i−1).L e tngood (t) and nbad (t) denote
the numbers of good and bad neighbor nodes at time t,
respectively, with ngood(t)+nbad (t)=n(t). Then, the
population of good and bad neighbor nodes at time tI,i just
prior to IDS execution can be recursively estimated from the
population of good and bad neighbor nodes at time tI,i−1 as
follows:
ngood (tI,i)=ngood (tI,i−1) − ngood (tI,i−1) × Pc
nbad (tI,i)=nbad (tI,i−1)+ngood (tI,i−1) × Pc (3)
After the voting-based IDS is executed, some good nodes
will be misidentiﬁed as bad nodes with probability Pfp and
will be mistakenly removed from the HWSN. Consequently,
we need to adjust the population of good nodes after IDS
execution. Let ngood (t) be the number of good neighbor nodes
at time t right after IDS execution. Then,
ngood(tI,i)=ngood(tI,i) − ngood (tI,i) × Pfp (5)
With ngood (t) and nbad (t) in hand, we estimate the system-
level false positive probability (Pfp) and false negative prob-
ability (Pfn) at time t as a resulting of executing the voting-
based IDS as Eq. (4) at the top of the next page, where
mmaj is the minimum majority of m, e.g., 3 is the minimum
majority of 5, and ω is Hpfp for calculating Pfp and Hpfn
for calculating Pfn. We explain Eq. (4) for the false positive
probability at time t below. The explanation to the false
negative probability is similar. A false positive results when
the majority of the voters vote against the target node (which
is a good node) as compromised. The ﬁrst term in Eq. (4)
accounts for the case in which more than 1/2 of the voters
selected from the target node’s neighbors are bad sensors who,
as a result of performing bad-mouthing attacks, will always
vote a good node as a bad node to break the functionality
of the HWSN. Since more than 1/2 of the m voters vote
no, the target node (which is a good node) is diagnosed as
a bad node in this case, resulting in a false positive. Here the
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Pfp or Pfn ≡
m−mmaj  
i=0
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
C
 
nbad
mmaj + i
 
× C
 
ngood
m − (mmaj + i)
 
C
 
nbad + ngood
m
 
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦
+
m−mmaj  
i=0
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎣
C
 
nbad
i
 
×
 m−1
j=mmaj−1 C
  
ngood
j
 
× ωi × C
 
ngood−j
m − i − j
 
× (1 − ω)
m−i−j
 
C
 
nbad + ngood
m
 
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎦ (4)
voters out of all neighbor nodes, and the numerator is the
total number of combinations to select at least mmaj bad
voters out of nbad nodes and the remaining good voters out
of ngood nodes. The second term accounts for the case in
which more than 1/2 of the voters selected from the neighbors
are good nodes but unfortunately some of these good nodes
mistakenly misidentify the target nodes as a bad node with
host false positive probability Hpfp, resulting in more than
1/2 of the voters (although some of those are good nodes)
voting no against the target node. Since more than 1/2 of the
m voters vote no, the target node (which is a good node)
is also diagnosed as a bad node in this case, again resulting
in a false positive. Here the denominator is again the total
number of combinations to select m voters out of all neighbor
nodes, and the numerator is the total number of combinations
to select i bad voters not exceeding the majority mmaj, j
good voters who diagnose incorrectly with i+j ≥ mmaj,a n d
the remaining m −i −j good voters who diagnose correctly.
We apply intrusion detection to both CHs and SNs, i.e., m
CH voters would be used to assess a target CH and m SN
voters will be used to assess a target SN node. Here we note
that more voters do not necessarily provide better detection
accuracy since it depends on the percentage of bad node
population. That is, if more bad nodes exist than good nodes in
the neighborhood, or good nodes have high host false positive
probability (Hpfp) and host false negative probability (Hpfn),
then more voters will provide less detection accuracy.
On the other hand, some bad nodes will remain in the
system because the voting-based IDS fails to identify them
with probability Pfn.L e tnbad (t) be the number of bad
neighbor nodes at time t right after IDS execution. Then,
nbad (tI,i)=nbad (tI,i) − nbad (tI,i) × (1 − Pfn) (6)
As the capture attack is totally random, the probability that
any neighbor node is a bad node at time t, denoted by Qc,j (t),
thus is given by:
Qc,j (tI,i)=
nbad (tI,i)
nbad (tI,i)+ngood (tI,i)
(7)
Qc,j (t) derived above provides critical information because
a bad node can perform packet dropping attacks if it is on
a path from source SNs to the PC. Here we note that the
node population density is evolving because of some nodes
being compromised and some being detected and evicted by
the IDS dynamically. The node population remains the same
until the next IDS execution (after TIDS seconds) because the
IDS only detects and evicts nodes periodically (as typically
node hardware/software failure happens less frequently than
security failure). The remaining nodes comprise both good
nodes that pass the IDS evaluation and bad nodes that are
undetected by the IDS. Denote the node population density at
time t by λ(t) with λ(0) = λ. Then, λ(t) can be computed
by:
n(tI,i)=nbad (tI,i)+ngood(tI,i) (8)
λ(tI,i)=
n(tI,i)
πr2 (9)
With Eq. (8) we compute the neighbor node populations
for CHs and SNs, denoted by nCH (tI,i) and nSN (tI,i),
respectively. With Eq. (9) we derive the CH and SN node
densities at time t, λCH (tI,i) and λSN (tI,i), respectively.
The total numbers of CHs and SNs in the system, denoted by
NCH (tI,i) and NSN (tI,i), respectively, can be computed by:
NCH (tI,i)=λCH (tI,i) × A2 (10)
NSN (tI,i)=λSN (tI,i) × A
2 (11)
We deﬁne the required network connectivity as the required
redundancy level for effecting multipath routing deﬁned by
(mp, ms). Thus, the radio range at time tI,i is adjusted by:
rCH (tI,i)=
 
mp
πfλCH (tI,i)
;rSN (tI,i)=
 
ms
πfλSN (tI,i)
(12)
B. Query Success Probability
We will use the notation SNj to refer to SN j and CHj
to refer to CH j. There are three ways by which data
forwarding from CHj to CHk could fail: (a) transmission
speed violation; (b) sensor/channel failures; and (c) CHj is
compromised. The ﬁrst source of failure, transmission speed
violation, accounts for query deadline violation. To know
the failure probability due to transmission speed violation,
we ﬁrst derive the minimum hop-by-hop transmission speed
required to satisfy the query deadline Treq.L e tdSN−CH be
the expected distance between a SN (selected to report sensor
readings) and its CH and dCH−PC be the expected distance
between the source CH and the PC accepting the query result.
Given a query deadline Treq as input, a data packet from a
SN through its CH to the PC must reach the PC within Treq.
Thus, the minimum hop-by-hop transmission speed denoted
by Sreq is given by:
Sreq =
dSN−CH + dCH−PC
Treq
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We follow the Voronoi theory [34] that during clustering
SNs will join the closest CH to form a Voronoicell and that the
expected distance from a SN to its CH is given by dSN−CH =
1/2(λCH)
1/2. On the other hand, since a query may be issued
from anywhere by the mobile user to a CH (which serves as
the PC) and the source CH requested by the query also can be
anywhere in the HWSN, dCH−PC essentially is the average
distance between any two CHs in the HWSN. Given location
randomness of CHs in the square area A2, it can be shown
geometrically that the average distance between any two CHs
is dCH−PC =0 .382A. With the knowledge of dSN−CH and
dCH−PC, we can estimate the average numbers of hops to
forward data from a SN to the source CH, denoted by Nh
SC,
and the average numbers of hops to forward data from the
source CH to the PC, denoted by Nh
CP. Speciﬁcally,
Nh
SC = dSN−CH/rSN;Nh
cp = dCH−PC/rCH. (14)
Let Qt,jk denote the probability that the forwarding speed
from CHj to CHk would violate the minimum speed require-
ment, thus leading to a query deadline violation failure. To
calculate Qt,jk we need to know the transmission speed Sjk
from CHj to CHk. This can be dynamically measured by
CHj following the approach described in [2]. If Sjk is above
Sreq then Qt,jk =0 ;o t h e r w i s e ,Qt,jk =1 . In general Sjk is
not known until runtime. If Sjk is uniformly distributed within
a range [a,b],t h e nQt,jk can be computed as:
QCH
t,jk (t)=cdf (Sjk ≤ Sreq)=
Sreq − a
b − a
(15)
The second source of failure is due to node failure or
channel failure. Let Qrj denote the probability of failure due to
node failure or channel failure. Since q is the hardware failure
probability, given as input, and ej is the per-hop transmission
failure probability of node j, measured by node j at runtime,
Qr,j can be estimated by:
Q
CH
r,j =1− [(1 − q)(1− ej)] (16)
The third source of failure is due to node j being com-
promised and thus the packet is dropped. We make use of
QCH
c,j (t) derived earlier in Eq. (7). By combining these three
failure probabilities we obtain QCH
rtc,jk(t), the probability of
CHj failing to relay a data packet to a one-hop neighbor CHk
because of either speed violation, sensor/channel failure, or
CHj being compromised, as:
Q
CH
rtc,jk(t)=1 −
  
1 − Q
CH
r,j
  
1 − Q
CH
t,jk (t)
  
1 − Q
CH
c,j (t)
  
(17)
By using this one-hop failure probability, we next compute
the success probability for CHj to transmit a packet to at
least one next-hop CH neighbor along the direction of the
destination node as:
θCH
j =1−
f×nCH  
k=1
QCH
rtc,jk(t) (18)
with f =1 /4 to account for the fact that only neighbor
CHs in the quadrant toward the destination node can perform
geographic forwarding; nCH is the number of neighbor CHs
of CHj as derived from Eq. (8).
Since on average there will be Nh
CP hops on a path from
the source CH to the PC, a data packet transmitted along the
path is successfully delivered only if it is delivered successful
hop-by-hop without experiencing any speed violation failure,
hardware/channel failure, or packet dropping failure, for Nh
CP
hops. Consequently, the probability of a single path between
the source CH and the PC being able to deliver data success-
fully is given by:
Θ
 
Nh
CP
 
=
⎛
⎝
N
h
CP−1  
j=1
θCH
j
⎞
⎠ ×
 
1 − QCH
rtc,Nh
CP(Nh
CP+1)
 
×
 
(1 − q)
 
1 − Q
CH
c,PC
  
(19)
For redundancy management, we create mp paths between
the source CH and the PC for path redundancy.T h emp
paths are formed by choosing mp CHs in the ﬁrst hop and
then choosing only one CH in each of the subsequent hops.
The source CH will fail to deliver data to the PC if one of
the following happens: (a) none of the CHs in the ﬁrst hop
receives the message; (b) in the ﬁrst hop, i (1 ≤ i<m p)
CHs receive the message, and each of them attempts to form
a path for data delivery; however, all i paths fail to deliver
the message because the subsequent hops fail to receive the
broadcast message; or (c) in the ﬁrst hop, at least mp CHs
receive the message from the source CH from which mp CHs
are randomly selected to forward data, but all mp paths fail
to deliver the message because the subsequent hops fail to
receive the message. Summarizing above, the probability of
the source CH failing to deliver data to the PC is given by
Eq. (20) at the top of the next page.
Following the same derivation to Eq. (19), the success
probability of a single path from a SN to its CH is given
by:
Θ
 
Nh
SC
 
=
⎛
⎝
N
h
SC−1  
j=1
θSN
j
⎞
⎠×
 
1 − QSN
rt,Nh
SC(Nh
SC+1)
 
(21)
We use ms SNs to report query responses to their source
CH for source redundancy. The probability that all ms SNs
fail to deliver data to their CH is thus given by:
Q
ms
fs =
ms  
i=1
 
1 − Θi
 
Nh
SC
  
(22)
Consequently, the failure probability of data delivery from
ms SNs to the CH, and subsequently using mp paths to relay
data from source CH to PC, is given by:
Qf =1−
 
1 − Q
mp
fp
  
1 − Q
ms
fs
 
(23)
Therefore, the query success probability is given by:
Rq =1− Qf (24)
Note that in the above derivation we omit time for brevity.
More precisely, Rq derived above should be Rq (tQ,i) since
the query success probability is a function of time, depending
on the node count (Eq. (8)) and population density (Eq. (9))
at the ith query’s execution time (i.e., at time tQ,i).196 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORK AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT, VOL. 10, NO. 2, JUNE 2013
Q
mp
fp =1 − θCH
1 +
 
|I|<mp
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
  
 
i∈I
 
1 − QCH
rtc,1i
 
 
×
 
 
i/ ∈I
 
QCH
rtc,1i
 
  
×
 
 
i∈I
 
1 − Θi
 
Nh
CP − 1
  
 
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
+
 
|I|≥mp
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
  
 
i∈I
 
1 − QCH
rtc,1i
 
 
×
 
 
i/ ∈I
 
QCH
rtc,1i
 
  
×
 
 
i∈M,M⊆I,|M|=mp
 
1 − Θi
 
Nh
CP − 1
  
 
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
(20)
C. Energy Consumption
Now we estimate the amounts of energy spent during a
query interval [tQ,i,t Q,i+1], an IDS interval [tI,i,t I,i+1],a n d
a clustering interval [tC,i,t C,i+1],s oa st oe s t i m a t eNq,t h e
maximum number of queries the system can possible handle
before running into energy exhaustion. To normalize energy
consumption over Nq queries, let α be the ratio of the IDS
execution rate to the query arrival rate and let β be the ratio
of the clustering rate to the query arrival rate so that αNq
and βNq are the numbers of IDS cycles and clustering cycles,
respectively, before system energy exhaustion. Then, we can
estimate Nq by the fact that the total energy consumed due to
intrusion detection, clustering and query processing is equal
to the system energy as follows:
Einit =
αNq 
i=1
EIDS(tI,i)+
βNq 
i=1
Eclustering (tC,i)+
Nq 
i=1
Eq (tQ,i)
(25)
Below we outline how to calculate EIDS (tI,i),
Eclustering (tC,i) and Eq (tQ,i). We ﬁrst estimate the
amount of energy consumed by transmission and reception
over wireless link. The energy spent by a SN to transmit an
encrypted data packet of length nb bits over a distance r is
estimated as [1]:
Et = nb (Eelec + Eampr
x) (26)
Here Eelec is the energy dissipated to run the transmitter
and receiver circuitry, Eamp is the energy used by the transmit
ampliﬁer, and r is the transmission radio range. We use the
current rCH and rSN to derive ECH
T and ESN
T .W es e t
Eamp =1 0pJ/bit/m2 and x =2when d<d 0,a n dEamp =
0.0013 pJ/bit/m4 and x =4otherwise. The energy spent by
a node to receive an encrypted message of length nb bits is
given by:
ER = nbEelec (27)
The energy consumed for processing the ith query,
Eq (tQ,i), is the sum of the energy consumed through mp
paths for the communication between CH and PC, denoted by
ECH
q (tQ,i), and the energy consumed for the communication
between ms source SNs and the source CH, denoted by
ESN
q (tQ,i), i.e.,
Eq (tQ,i)=ECH
q (tQ,i)+ESN
q (tQ,i) (28)
The energy consumed for the communication between CH
and PC is due to setting up mp paths in the ﬁrst hop and
subsequently transmitting data over the mp paths, i.e.,
ECH
q (tQ,i)=
 
ECH
T + nCH (tQ,i)ECH
R
 
+
 
mp
 
Nh
CP − 1
  
ECH
T + nCH (tQ,i)ECH
R
  
(29)
Here the ﬁrst term accounts for the transmission energy con-
sumed by the source CH and the reception energy consumed
by its 1-hop CHs for setting up the mp paths, and the second
term accounts for the energy consumed for data transmission
over the mp paths in the remaining Nh
CP−1. We note that the
number of neighbor CHs at time t, nCH (t)=λCH (t)×πr2
CH
by Eq. (9), depends on the CH population density at time t,
i.e., λCH (t).
The energy consumed for the communication between
source SNs and the CH is due to transmitting data over the
ms paths each with Nh
SC hops, i.e.,
ESN
q (tQ,i)=msNh
SC
 
ESN
T + nSN (tQ,i)ESN
R
 
(30)
For clustering, the system would consume energy for
broadcasting the announcement message and for the cluster-
join process. There will be NCH (tc,i) CHs each broad-
casting the announcement message at time tc,i, for a total
energy consumption of NCH (tc,i) × ECH
T . There will be
NSN (tc,i) SNs each on average receiving nCH (tc,i) an-
nouncement messages from CHs within radio broadcast range
rCH (tc,i) at time tc,i, for a total energy consumption of
NSN (tc,i)×nCH (tc,i)×ESN
R . The cluster-join process will
require a SN to send a message to the CH through multi-
hop routing informing that it will join the cluster. There
will be NSN (tc,i) SNs each transmitting a join packet to
the CH it selects to join, for a total energy consumption of
NSN (tc,i) × ECH
R for packet reception by the selected CHs
plus NSN (tc,i) × Nh
SC
 
ESN
T + nSN (tc,i)ESN
R
 
for multi-
hop routing to the selected CHs. Summarizing above, the
energy consumed for executing the clustering algorithm by
CHs and SNs at time tc,i, denoted by Eclustering (tc,i),i s
given by:
Eclustering (tc,i)=NCH (tc,i) × ECH
T + NSN (tc,i)
× nCH (tc,i) × E
SN
R
+ NSN (tc,i) × E
CH
R + NSN (tc,i)
× Nh
SC
 
ESN
T + nSN (tc,i)ESN
R
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Fig. 2. CH execution for dynamic redundancy management.
Lastly, for intrusion detection every node is evaluated by m
voters in an IDS cycle, and each voter sends its vote to the
other m − 1 voters. Hence, the energy spent in each voting-
based IDS cycle, denoted by EIDS (tI,i), is given by:
EIDS (tI,i)=ECH
IDS (tI,i)+ESN
IDS (tI,i)
ECH
IDS (tI,i)=NCH (tI,i−1)[m(m − 1)]
 
ECH
T + nCH (tI,i−1)ECH
R
 
ESN
IDS (tI,i)=NSN (tI,i−1)[m(m − 1)]
 
ESN
E + nSN (tI,i−1)ESN
R
 
(32)
After we obtain EIDS (tI,i), Eclustering (tC,i) and
Eq (tQ,i) from Eqs. (32), (31) and (28), respectively, we
calculate Nq from Eq. (25). The knowledge of Nq along with
Rq (tQ,i) in Eq. (24) allows us to calculate the system MTTF
given by Eq. (1).
V. ALGORITHM FOR DYNAMIC REDUNDANCY
MANAGEMENT OF MULTIPATH ROUTING
The objective of dynamic redundancy management is to
dynamically identify and apply the best redundancy level in
terms of path redundancy (mp) and source redundancy (ms),
as well as the best intrusion detection settings in terms of the
number of voters (m) and the intrusion invocation interval
(TIDS) to maximize MTTF, in response to environment
changes to input parameters including SN/CH node density
(λSN/λCH), radio range (rSN/rCH), and SN/CH capture
rate (λc).
Our algorithm for dynamic redundancy management of
multipath routing is distributed in nature. Figs. 2 and 3
describe the CH and SN execution protocols, respectively,
for managing multipath routing for intrusion tolerance to
maximize the system lifetime. They specify control actions
taken by individual SNs and CHs in response to dynamically
changing environments.
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Fig. 3. SN execution for dynamic redundancy management.
All nodes in the system act periodically to a “TD timer”
event to adjust the optimal parameter setting in response to
changing environments. This is indicated on line 3 in both
Fig. 2 for a CH and Fig. 3 for a SN. The optimal design
settings in terms of optimal TIDS, m, ms,a n dmp are
determined at static design time and pre-stored in a table
over perceivable ranges of input parameter values. As there
is no base station in the system, the duty of performing a
table lookup operation with interpolation and/or extrapolation
techniques applied to determine the optimal design parameter
settings will be assumed by CHs. The action performed by a
CH upon a TD timer event includes (a) adjusting CH radio
range to maintain CH connectivity (line 4 in Fig. 2); (b)
determining TIDS, m, ms,a n dmp (line 5 in Fig. 2) based
on the sensed environmental conditions at runtime; and (c)
notifying SNs within the cluster of the new TIDS and m
settings. The action performed by a SN upon this TD timer
event is to adjust its radio range to maintain SN connectivity
within a cluster (line 4 in Fig. 3). The action taken by a SN
upon receiving the control packet from its CH is to update
the new TIDS and m settings (line 6 in Fig. 3) for intrusion
detection. When the TIDS timer event happens, each node
in the system uses it current TIDS and m settings to perform
intrusion detection. The TIDS timer event and the action taken
are speciﬁed on lines 11–14 in Fig. 2 for a CH and lines 9–12
in Fig. 3 for a SN.
When a CH acting as a query processing center (PC)
receives a query from a user, it triggers multipath routing
for intrusion tolerance using the current optimal ms and mp
settings to prolong the system useful lifetime. This query
arrival event and the action taken are speciﬁed on lines 7-8
in Fig.2. When a data packet arrival event occurs, each node
simply follows the prescribed multipath routing protocol to
route the packet (lines 15–16 in Fig. 2 and lines 13–14 in
Fig. 3). Finally each node periodically performs clustering as
prescribed by the cluster algorithm, i.e., when a Tclustering
timer event occurs, each node executes clustering (lines 9–10
in Fig. 2 and lines 7–8 in Fig. 3) for periodic cluster formation.
The cost of executing the dynamic redundancy manage-
ment algorithm described above, including periodic clustering,198 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORK AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT, VOL. 10, NO. 2, JUNE 2013
TABLE II
INPUT PARAMETERVALUES CHARACTERIZINGA QUERY-BASED
CLUSTEREDHWSN
Parameter Default  Value 
 3000 
  100 
  30 nodes/(20 x 20 m
2) 
  1 node/(20 x 20 m
2) 
  0.8 Joules 
  10 Joules 
  [5-25] m 
  [25-120] m 
Tclustering  60 sec 
q  10
-6 
ej  [0.0001 –  0.1] 
f  ¼ 
λq  1 query/sec 
 (or 1/λc)   [4-28] days 
A  200m 
nb    50 bits   
Eelec  50 nJ/bit 
Eamp  10 pJ/bit/m
2 
  75m 
Treq  [0.3 – 1.0] sec 
Hpfp   , Hpfn [0.01-0.05] 
 
periodic intrusion detection, and query processing through
multipath routing, in terms of energy consumption has been
considered in Section IV-C Energy Consumption. The extra
messaging overhead for each CH to notify SNs within its
cluster of the new TIDS and m settings (line 6 in Fig. 2)
can be eliminated if the CH notiﬁes the optimal settings to its
SNs at the time periodic clustering is performed.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present numerical data obtained as a
result of applying Eq. (1). Table II lists the set of input
parameter values characterizing a clustered HWSN. Our ex-
ample HWSN consists of 3000 SN nodes and 100 CH nodes,
deployed in a square area of A2 (200m × 200m). Nodes
are distributed in the area following a Poisson process with
density λSN =3 0nodes/(20 × 20 m2) and λCH =1
node/(20×20 m2) at deployment time. The radio ranges rSN
and rCH are dynamically adjusted between 5m to 25m and
25m to 120m respectively to maintain network connectivity.
The initial energy levels of SN and CH nodes are ESN
0 =0 .8
Joules and ECH
0 =1 0Joules so that they exhaust energy at
about the same time. The energy parameters used by the radio
module are adopted from [1], [35]. The energy dissipation
Eelec to run the transmitter and receiver circuitry is 50 nJ/bit.
The energy used by the transmit ampliﬁer to achieve an
acceptable signal to noise ratio (Eamp) is 10 pJ/bit/m2 for
transmitted distances less than the threshold distance d0 (75m)
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Fig. 4. Computational procedure to determine optimal (mp,m s) for
maximizing MTTF.
and 0.0013 pJ/bit/m4 for distances greater than d0. The query
arrival rate λq is a variable and is set to 1 query/sec to reveal
points of interest. The query deadline Treq is strict and set to
between 0.3 and 1 sec. The SN capture time is exponential
distributed with rate λc such that Pc =1 −e−λc×TIDS.W et e s t
the effect of λc by varying the inter-arrival time in between
attacks (Tcomp) from 4 to 28 days, corresponding to an attack
rate (λc) of once per 4 days to once per 28 days. The host
IDS false positive probability and false negative probability
(Hpfp and Hpfn) vary between 1% and 5% to reﬂect the host
intrusion detection strength as in [10].
Fig. 4 shows a high level description of the computational
procedure to determine the optimal redundancylevel (mp,m s)
for maximizing MTTF. The MTTF Eq. (Eq. (1)) is embedded
on lines 15–21 and 30–31 in Fig. 4. The accumulation of
queries is shown on line 13. The value of Nq is computed
on line 32. Lines 7 and 8 contain the conditions the systemAL-HAMADI and CHEN: REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT OF MULTIPATH ROUTING FOR INTRUSION TOLERANCE IN HETEROGENEOUS WIRELESS ... 199
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Fig. 6. Effect of (mp,m s) on query reliability (Rq).
must hold to remain alive while computing an MTTF value
for a speciﬁc redundancy level. The computational procedure
essentially has a complexity of O(mp×ms) as it exhaustively
searches for the best (mp, ms) pair, given a set of input pa-
rameter values as listed in Table II (above) as well as instance
values of m (the number of voters for intrusion detection)
and TIDS (the intrusion detection interval) characterizing a
HWSN.
Below we present numerical data to provide evidence of the
correctness of our analysis and to provide physical interpreta-
tions of the results. A query response propagates over SNs for
source redundancy (ms) and over CHs for path redundancy
(mp). Hence, ms directly affects energy consumption of SNs
and mp directly affects energy consumption of CHs. Figs. 5–
7 summarize the effect of (mp,m s) on the CH/SN energy,
query reliability, and CH/SN radio range, respectively, for the
case in which Tcomp = 4 days and TIDS=1 0h r s .I nF i g .
5, a relatively high mp leads to quick energy depletion of
a CH node. Similarly, a relatively high ms leads to quick
energy depletion of a SN. While energydetermines the number
of queries the system is able to execute, the system lifetime
largely depends on query reliability. Fig. 6 shows the effect of
(mp,m s) on query reliability. The combination of (4, 3) has
the highest query reliability over other combinations of (2, 5)
or (5, 2) in this test scenario.
The system dynamically adjusts the radio range of CHs and
SNs to maintain network connectivity based on Eq. (10) as
nodes are being removed from the system because of failure
or eviction. Fig. 7 shows that the rates at which radio ranges
of CHs and SNs increase are highly sensitive to mp and ms,
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respectively. A sharp increase of the radio range affects the
energy consumption rate and thus the system lifetime. Overall,
Figs. 5–7 indicate that there exist an optimal combination
of (mp,m s) that will maximize the system lifetime. Fig.
8 conﬁrms that among three (mp,m s) combinations, (4, 3)
results in the highest MTTF, since it has the highest query
reliability without consuming too much energy per query
execution.
The correctness of our protocol design is evidenced by the
effect of Tcomp, m,a n dTIDS on optimal (mp,m s).F i g s .9
a n d1 0s h o wM T T Fv s .(mp,m s) under low and high attack
rates, respectively. First of all, in both graphs, we observe the
existence of an optimal (mp,m s) value under which MTTF
is maximized. Secondly, there exists an optimal m value (the
number of voters) to maximize MTTF. In Fig. 10, m =7
yields a higher MTTF value than m =3because in this
scenario the attack rate is relatively high (one in four days), so
a higher number of voters is needed to cope with and detect
bad nodes more effectively, to result in a higher query success
rate and thus a higher MTTF. Comparing these two graphs,
we observe a trend that as the capture rate increases (i.e.,
going from the left graph to the right graph), the optimal m
value level increases. The reason is that as the capture rate
increases, there are more and more malicious nodes in the
system, so using more voters (e.g. m =7 ) can help identify
and evict malicious nodes more effectively, thus increasing the
query success probability and consequently the MTTF value.
The system is better off this way to cope with increasing
malicious node population for lifetime maximization even
though more energy is consumed due to more voters being200 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORK AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT, VOL. 10, NO. 2, JUNE 2013
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used. By comparing these two graphs, we observe a trend
that as the capture rate increases (i.e., going from Fig. 9 to
Fig. 10), the optimal (mp,m s) redundancy level increases.
When the capture rate increases from once in three weeks
(Tcomp =3weeks) to once in four days (Tcomp =4days),
the optimal m changes from m =3to m =7 .W ea l s o
observe that the optimal (mp,m s) redundancy level changes
from (3, 3) to (4, 4) when m =3 . The reason behind this
trend is that as more nodes are compromised in the system, a
higher redundancy must be used to cope with packet dropping
attacks. While increasing (mp,m s) consumes more energy,
the gain towards increasing the query success probability (and
thus towards increasing MTTF) outweighs the loss of lifetime
due to energy consumption.
Another trend exhibited in Figs. 9 and 10 is that as the
number of voters in intrusion detection (m) increases, the
optimal (mp,m s) redundancy level decreases. This is because
increasing m has the effect of detecting and evicting bad nodes
more effectively, thus requiring a lower level of redundancy in
(mp,m s) to cope with packet dropping attacks by bad nodes.
In Fig. 10, when m =3 , the optimal (mp,m s)=( 4 ,4) while
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TABLE III
OPTIMAL(mp,m s) WITH VARYINGTcomp ANDm
m=3 m=5 m=7
4 days  (5,4)  (4,4)  (4,4) 
1  week (4,4) (3,3) (3,3) 
3weeks (3,3) (3,3) (3,3) 
when m =7the optimal (mp,m s)=( 3 ,3).
In Fig. 11, we compare MTTF vs. (mp,m s) under three
cases: (a) there are no malicious nodes and no intrusion de-
tection, considering using multipath routing for fault tolerance
only as in [8] (the top curve); (b) there are malicious nodes
but there is no intrusion detection (the bottom curve); (c)
there are malicious nodes and there is intrusion detection (the
middle two curves). First of all, in each case we observe the
existence of an optimal (mp,m s) value under which MTTF
is maximized. Secondly, for the special case in which there
are no malicious nodes (the top curve), the optimal (mp,m s)
value to maximize MTTF is (3, 3) and the MTTF is the
highest among three cases because there are no malicious
nodes. When there are malicious nodes, however, the optimal
(mp,m s) value becomes (5, 5) because using higher redun-
dancy in multisource multipath routing is necessary to cope
with malicious nodes that perform insider attacks. By applying
intrusion detection, the MTTF value of the system under attack
is increased. Fig. 11 reﬂects the IDS case in Fig. 9.
We summarize the effect of Tcomp and m on the optimal
(mp,m s) value in Table III and the effect of Tcomp on the
optimal m value at which MTTF is maximized in Table IV.
Table III shows that as the capture rate increases (i.e., a
smaller Tcomp), the optimal (mp,m s) redundancy level should
increase in order to cope with more bad nodes in the system
performing packet dropping attacks. Also, as the number of
voters (m) decreases and thus the detection strength decreases,
the optimal (mp,m s) redundancy level should increase to
cope with more bad nodes in the system. Table IV shows that
as the capture rate increases (i.e., a smaller Tcomp), the optimalAL-HAMADI and CHEN: REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT OF MULTIPATH ROUTING FOR INTRUSION TOLERANCE IN HETEROGENEOUS WIRELESS ... 201
TABLE IV
OPTIMALm WITH VARYINGTcomp AND TIDS
=4hrs 8hrs 14hrs 18hrs 24hrs 
4 days  3  5  7  7  7 
1 week  3  5  5  7  7 
2 weeks  3  3  5  5  7 
3 weeks  3  3  5  5  5 
TABLE V
OPTIMALTIDS WITH VARYINGTcomp ANDm
m=3 m=5 m=7
4 days  6 hrs  10  14 
1 week  8  10  16 
2 weeks  14  24  36 
3 weeks  24  40  52 
m value level should increase so as to strengthen intrusion
detection to remove more bad nodes from the system. Also as
TIDS decreases so that the detection strength increases, the
optimal m value should decrease so as not to waste energy
unnecessarily to adversely affect the system lifetime.
We further ascertain the correctness of our analysis by the
effect of TIDS (IDS detection interval) on MTTF. Figs. 12
and 13 show MTTF vs. TIDS with varying m under low
capture rate (Tcomp =3weeks) and high capture rate (Tcomp
=1week), respectively. We ﬁrst observe that there exists
an optimal TIDS value under which MTTF is maximized.
Furthermore, the optimal TIDS value increases as m increases.
For example, in Fig. 12 as m increases from 3, 5 to 7 we
see that correspondingly the optimal TIDS at which MTTF is
maximized increases from 8, 10 to 16 hours. The reason is that
as the number of voters increases so the intrusion detection
capability increases per invocation, there is no need to invoke
intrusion detection too often so as not to waste energy and
adversely shorten the system lifetime. We also observe two
general trends. One trend is that as TIDS increases, the optimal
m value increases. The reason is that when TIDS is small so
intrusion detection is invoked frequently, we don’t need many
voters per invocation so as not to waste energy unnecessarily
to adversely shorten the system lifetime. The second trend
shown in Figs. 12 and 13 is that as the node capture rate
increases, the optimal m value increases in order to cope with
more compromised nodes in the system. These two trends
correlate well with those summarized in Table IV earlier.
Lastly, we examine the sensitivity of the optimal TIDS
to the capture rate. Fig. 14 shows MTTF vs. TIDS with
varying Tcomp values. It exhibits the trend that as the capture
rate increases (a smaller Tcomp value), the optimal TIDS
at which MTTF is maximized must decrease to cope with
malicious attacks. For example, in Fig. 14 the optimal TIDS
is 24 hours when Tcomp =4weeks and reduces to 6 hours
when Tcomp =4days. The reason is that when the capture
TABLE VI
EFFECT OF CAPTURE RATE ON MAXIMUMRADIO RANGE TO MAINTAIN
CONNECTIVITY
4 days  21.5m  117.7m 
1 week  15.9  82.2 
2 weeks  11.4  62.4 
3 weeks  10.9  60 
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Fig. 12. Effect of TIDS on MTTF under low capture rate.
rate is low and hence the malicious node population is low,
the negative effects of wasting energy for IDS execution
(through evicting falsely identiﬁed nodes and executing the
voting mechanism) outweighs the gain in the query success
probability, so the system is better off by executing intrusion
detection less often. On the other hand, when the capture
rate is high and the malicious node population is high, the
gain in the query success probability because of evicting
malicious nodes often outweighs the energy wasted because
of frequent IDS execution, so the system is better off by
executing intrusion detection often. Table V summarizes the
effect of Tcomp and m on the optimal TIDS value at which
MTTF is maximized. Table VI further summarizes the effect
of Tcomp on the maximum radio range required to maintain
network connectivity in terms of the optimal redundancy level
to prolong the system lifetime.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we performed a tradeoff analysis of energy
consumption vs. QoS gain in reliability, timeliness, and secu-
rity for redundancy management of clustered heterogeneous
wireless sensor networks utilizing multipath routing to answer
user queries. We developed a novel probability model to
analyze the best redundancy level in terms of path redun-
dancy (mp) and source redundancy (ms),a sw e l la st h e
best intrusion detection settings in terms of the number of
voters (m) and the intrusion invocation interval (TIDS) under
which the lifetime of a heterogeneous wireless sensor network
is maximized while satisfying the reliability, timeliness and
security requirements of query processing applications in the
presence of unreliable wireless communication and malicious
nodes. Finally, we applied our analysis results to the design of
a dynamic redundancy management algorithm to identify and202 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORK AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT, VOL. 10, NO. 2, JUNE 2013
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apply the best design parameter settings at runtime in response
to environment changes to prolong the system lifetime.
For future work, we plan to explore more extensive mali-
cious attacks in addition to packet dropping and bad mouthing
attacks, each with different implications to energy, security and
reliability, and investigate intrusion detection and multipath
routing based tolerance protocols to react to these attacks.
Another direction is to consider smart and insidious attackers
which can perform more targeted attacks, capture certain
strategic nodes with higher probability, alternate between
benign and malicious behavior and collude with other attack-
ers to avoid intrusion detection. Lastly, we plan to investi-
gate the use of trust/reputation management [33], [36], [37]
to strengthen intrusion detection through “weighted voting”
leveraging knowledge of trust/reputation of neighbor nodes, as
well as to tackle the “what paths to use” problem in multipath
routing decision making for intrusion tolerance in WSNs. In
situations where concurrent query trafﬁc is heavy, we plan to
explore trust-based admission control [38]–[40] to optimize
application performance.
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